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responsibility. Just as bad theo~ ~eads to bad policy, good research, driven
?y good theo~, may lead to positive changes. I aspire in my work to make
Just such a difference. This goal will be achieved if I am effective in three
related areas: (1) by doing good research which reveals that social problems
emanate from social structure; (2) by engaging in social criticism, which
Herb~rt Gans called for so forcefully in his 1988 Presidential Address to the
~erlc~ S?ciological ~ssociation (1989, p. 7); and (3) by being a public
socloI?gtst, 1. e.,. by ~emg a keen analyst of society who communicates
effectiv~ly to .socIologIsts, students, and the lay public. I have organized my
pr.of~sslon;U ~e to accomplish these tasks. In doing SO, I am guided by Emily
DIC~SO~ s dictum: "Tell all the truth but tell it slant." The work (and I do not
consider It work) continues.
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INTRODUCTION
Some years ago Robert Merton (1964,p. 19) observed that our literature
on research methods tells us ways in which we ought to think, feel, and act but
says precious little about the ways in which we actually do think, feel, and act.
The significance of this insight became painfully clear during mymost recent
research stint in southern Africa. Certainly the tradition of sharing personal
reminiscences about research and setting remains, for reasons related to
discipline norms, rare among sociologists. Our stress on detachment and the
public persona ordinarily precludes concern for the interaction 'between
private person and the field. There are notable exceptions, of course--one
thinks of William Foote Whyte's "disarmingly candid" accounts of his Street
Comer Society work (1981, 1955), or Renee Fox's essay on her Belgium
medical research (1962).1 But we have little of the richness found in the
memoirs of anthropological scholars such as Malinowski (1922), Bohanon
(1964), Briggs (1970), Mead (1977), and more recently Ben Reina (1984).
They are reports that I have come, quite belatedly, to appreciate in spite of
having long internalized sociology's proscriptions.
The fact is that by the time I returned from South Africa two years ago,
I felt an urgent need to share something more personal with colleagues than
the typical "preliminary fmdings" or "state of South Africa" report. Following
a brief presentation in this vein at a departmental colloquium, colleagues
urged me to develop the theme. After some hesitancy--there is professional
risk--work is underway,2 and KU's invitation' to send..MARS something on
current. research, seemed a propitious opportunity to .stray from .the more
traditional chronicling into the "experiential mode." For with me still is the
intensity of feeling that South Africa evokes; perhaps my commentary will
provoke some rethinking re sociological endeavors.
* I wish to express my appreciation to colleagues, most especially Elizabeth
Fink, for thoughtful suggestions and feedback, and to the Centre for
Intergroup Studies, University of Cape Town for fmancial and "moral" support.
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Although my early professional work focused on American race and
ethnic relations, comparative ethnic stratification has always fascinated me. I
remember that as a young undergraduate reading Cry The Beloved Country
for a course at Washington State University long years ago, Alan Paton
captured my imagination and my heart; I knew even then that I would, one
day, travel his "lovely road..." to Africa (1947, p. 1). The first professional
opportunity came in the mid 1970's when the Centre for Inter-Racial Studies,
at what was then the University of Rhodesia, offered me a research
scholarship. I arrived in the capital--now Harare,. Zimbabwe--in the midst of
their war for liberation. The atmosphere, while scary, was also exhilarating,
for independence was at hand and my research on ethnicity among an
educated elite was fascinating. I returned in 1982 to study post-independence
effects and again a few years later to renew ties with land and people.
During the intervening years I had also attended professional conferences
that took me elsewhere in southern Africa. Then in early 1984 I was invited
to become a Visiting Fellow at the University of Cape Town's Centre for
Intergroup Studies, and to conduct research on what was hoped would become
a series of joint endeavors on apartheid and social change.3 By the time the
necessary paper work for my departure had been completed on both sides of
the ocean, we were well into 1986 and the Republic of South Africa was
engulfed in one of its bitterest eras since white intrusion some 338 years ago.
Nevertheless, for many it had been a time of hope; surely, majority rule was
fmally at hand.
Upon arrival at the Cape's Malan Airport I sensed anew the "morbid
fascination" this land evokes, this pariah nation of 32 million souls. On our
drive to town that first day I asked to take "the road less traveled" across the
Cape Flats, skirting the dull resettlement plots of Mitchell Plains for
Coloureds, Atholone for Asians, and on past Crossroads for Africans--the
three groups who by self-defmition are now known collectively as blacks. In
the sprawling Crossroads areas were the hidden camp-like townships, the
crude migrant single-sex barracks, and the pathetic, yet vibrant squatter
communities. Clearly, as a contrivance in social engineering, apartheid has
been an unholy success, compartmentalizing and scarring all it touches.
~ ... Andyet.i.South Africa.is.a land, blessed with great natural beauty, first-
rate weather much of the year, and people...people of infmite variety, talent '
and warmth. However much blacks suffer under the system, they--along with
their white brethren--evince an abiding love for this "benighted country," a fact
that continually touched and amazed me, as did its hills and valleys "lovely
beyond singing" (Paton 1947, p. 1). It would be an idyllic place, were it not
for the tragic reality hidden away from the casual white observer's eyes. This
was to become the most poignant research experience of my professional
career.
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THE RESEARCH FIELD AND SOME INTRUSIVE ISSUES
Time permits the highlighting of but two. intersecting lines o.f tho'!ght
concerning my South African saga: first, something of the personal--mtr'!"slons
on project, person, and field; and second, a look at two or three of the Issues
flowing from the above that have come to vex me.
The Project and Personal Demographics
When I was offered in early 1984 the fellowship at Cape Town I suggested
using Pretoria's proposed constitutional revisions as ~ backdro~ to test
conflicting hypotheses on social change. The first of a senes of studies would
investigate black urban response to, and involvement in, the newly proposed
Tricameral Parliament and Township Councils. By the time I arrived two
years later, however, I anticipated some, and' suddenly f~ced other difficult~es
with the project as originally approved. The dramatically charged SOCIO-
political climate, triggered by Pretoria's intemperate constitutional decisions
along with rising unemployment and related grievances, had altered the
context.4 Those blacks even seeming to cooperate with the newly installed
government structures were being defined as traitors or worse by their
communities and anti-apartheid groups.
My initial contacts with "experts" or key informants from outlying
communities cautioned that, were we to stick to the project as outlined, we
would likely be cut off from a broad spectrum of resistance organizations and
spokespersons. Moreover, we were now faced with a host of concepts and
topics, long a part of the South African scholarly dialogue, that had become
taboo according to one ideological stance or another--e.g., race,. r~form,
minority rights, ethnicity, power sharing, federalism, culture, group mterests,
free enterprise, pluralism. Government abuses of selected concepts and ~e
burgeoning popularity of Marxist theory among intellectuals made some of this
understandable. Yet much of the discord seemed irrational. Later I ran across
Peter Berger's commentary on ideologies and "clue concepts" which conjure
up a set of specific responses, positive or negative; this helped clarify (197~).
While grappling with the project focus, I was, s~ultane~~l'y faced .~th
dissonance over personal demographics. It wasn t Just. the initial suspicion
social scientists' commonly face, or the natural apprehension of people in an
authoritarian society. This was different. Various key informants found me
suspect because among other things: (1) I was an American; (2) ~ was ~
academic who was neither Marxist nor conservative; rather I was a liberal (in
the classic European sense, not in the current American right wing usage); (3)
I was affiliated with the University of Cape Town's Centre for Intergroup
Studies with its Quaker-like commitment to conflict resolu~ion;.and of course,
(4) I was a woman, an "older woman!" in a highly chau~.tic society. .
It was the level of anti-American hostility in my initial contacts With
"experts," not the fact of it, that caught me flat footed. Go~ewas the invariable
friendliness of earlier African visits. Most were still graCIOUS, yet the change
was dramatic, for the Reagan Administration had managed to alienate the
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right, the left, and the middle.5 I was asked what I was going to do about
sanctions and about U. S. meddling. Some thought I should be boycotting the
Republic's academic community. I explained that the American Sociological
Association and my section of the International Sociological Association,
though strongly anti-apartheid, were nevertheless opposed to scientific boycotts
which simply lead to intellectual atrophy. This placated most, but was
dismissed by a few as so much sophistry. I listened attentively to much
hyperbole about the States,6 and I suspect I felt as Renee Fox (1962) did when
her Belgium colleagues turned their suspicion and anger about the u.s. Congo
policy on to her during the 196Os.
The issue of my political bent was a bit more problematic. I tried to keep
a low profile, a neutral stance, but this--plus the absence of appropriate
buzzwords--gave me away. A couple of friendly, creative contacts were
ultimately lost because of my "ideological impurities." Others, while mad at
the U. S. government, forgave my being a "Yank," welcoming what they
perceived to be my humane understanding of their country's conundrum.
Finally, a few damned me before I could say "good morning." They "knew"
that my nationality and my political beliefs were inextricably intertwined and
would not forgive the "liberal, capitalist, bleeding heart, materialistic" cultural
baggage "so typical of you American intellectual types."
Those concerned about my affiliation with the Centre were I came to
realize, reflecting the paranoia that surrounds the country's associational Iife,
I~terestingly,the Centre has its own "rainbow coalition,"long standing contacts
WIth ANC and Nelson Mandela at one end, and with Dr. Andries Treurnicht
head of the reactionary Conservative Party, at the other. I'm sure that any
affiliation would have been suspect to one group or another, and the
Centre--an established part of the University's anti-apartheid structure--was
able to open many doors for the project. I didn't have to adhere to its non-
violent philosophy in toto to appreciate its place in the scheme of things.
I felt adrift, burned the midnight oil and sought counsel with the bright,
eager Centre staff. Some thought we should move ahead as originally planned,
but othe~s agreed that we must avoid, where possible, partisan schisms and
squabbles. Soon, wonder of wonders, a modifiedproposal rolled off the Xerox
machineon "Opposition.Politics as Agents.of Social Change." Concerns-in. the ," ,
original proposal would still be tapped, but the revision was inclusive,
encompassing a wide range of anti-apartheid organizational styles and voices
--black and white, legal and extra-legal, left and right. Interview schedules
were revised, associational lists compiled, archival materials tracked, and
observational opportunities systematized.7 We were in business!
The early negative vibes were not personal, I found. I had unwittingly
stepped into the middle of a society's ideological confusion and rhetorical
posturing, an experience that would ultimately lead to new, unanticipated
sociological concerns.
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Research and the Police State
In the above instances one might say that the project and I were intruders
on the field. But I also had to come to grips with the way in which the field
was intruding on the project and me. I have yet to find a reference to the
ways in which social scientists should react to, or behave in, an authoritarian
environment, or how such an environment might influence research outcomes.
Yet the context of the police state--an important research laboratory-does by
its very nature pose constraints upon investigation and investigator.8 To ignore
it, to treat it as a given is at the very least misleading, at most,.dishonest.
Good objective research is not precluded, but there IS always an
underlying tension; I assumed that I was under surveillance, that my phones
were tapped and my mail checked. (The Postal Censors held my mail from
the States for nearly a month at one point, finally delivering sixteen letters
from family and friends in one day.) I had no doubt that the security police
knew where I was at all times. At meetings and gatherings I wondered who
among the audience were government agents. At other times with the police
conspicuously present, I would wonder if this were the time that I would be
picked up, deportation notice given. Often my heart raced, and I dreamt of
yellow police bakkes (caged trucks)....and sirens!
My conversations were always a bit guarded in casual settings, although
pleasant and useful rapport was the norm even with the most reactionary bigot
or the most radical frrebrand. Appearing concerned (which I was) and non-
judgmental (which I sometimes was not) was the ke~. Empathy with ~nterview
subjects grew quickly as people from all walks of life responded WIth great
warmth and acceptance. Whether African township dwellers, Coloured
grassroots leaders, or Afrikaner Members of Parliament, they w.ere far more
willing to "open up" than I had imagined, and there were tou~hing momen~s
of confession, tears, affection...and rage. I fought to remam sympathetic
without becoming sentimental. And as the months passed and optimism about
change gave way, first to pessimism and then despair, I struggled to keep my
own sense of disappointment from intruding into the investigative process.
Leaders of the best known women's resistance group gave good advice,
''Never try to be devious." I tried, therefore',' to be as open as possible, to hide
nothing. Then, one day I realized that I was making my sex.and age workto
my advantage. After all, Ita little old lady in tennis shoes" can go a lot of
places, ask a lot of questions, and appear "naive" a lot of the t~e without
arousing suspicion. I believe that more than one security officer Ignored my
comings and goings for this reason.
Later restrictions under a new "state of emergency" made work more, . .
difficult. I learned that protest could become a seductive game; trying to
outwit the authorities after each new set of restraints could--had perhaps--
become a way of life for many resisters, risky but exhilarating.Sadly, it seemed
to divert energies away from the hard tasks required for confronting and
changing the system. What I noticed and came most to .regret, howeyer,.was
the enormous amount of self-policing and self-censorship across racial lines.
Acquiescence was the norm.
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The most difficult experience for me personally was what we came to call
"Crossroads Burning." It included days of project immobility as the Centre
staff provided mutual support. I had been in Zimbabwe during some rough
times, and I thought I was about as well informed of apartheid's excesses, and
as well prepared emotionally as one can be ...at a distance. Maybe I was. But
I had yet to receive my crash course in deviousness and cruelty, faith and
courage in totalitarian societies.
It began on May 19th, a clear, crisp autumn morning. The Cape fairly
sparkled following a week of rain; it was one of those days when you wanted
to shout to the skies, "God's in [her] Heaven, all's right with the world." The
time since my arrival had been fairly calm; the death count had slowed a bit
across the country. There was, to be sure, continued sporadic. violence
throughout the land, but the Western Cape seemed quiet following the intense
conflict of 1985 in spite of ongoing incidents. Within the past week the English
papers had reported the invasion of jeering, armed police into Coloured
classrooms on the Cape Flats, to Whip and beat students for alleged rock
throwing. And the Cape Times had that very morning mentioned a bit of
unrest in one of the areas of the Crossroads township. But there were hopeful
signs. Emergency regulations placed on major urban centers in late 1985 had
been lifted in mid-March and resistance groups were very active again.
Further, to enhance its "reform" image, the government was promising an end
to the hated forced removal, influx control, and pass laws. And most
significantly, the peace negotiations directed by the Commonwealth Countries
with Botha's cabinet and with Black leaders seemed to be making real
progress. .
As I made my way up Main Road toward campus I smiled, for a familiar
odor of burning leaves in the air reminded me of the autumn days of youth.
A good omen, I thought. But I was wrong.
D~rin~ the Centre's morning tea we learned that the government,
thumbing Its nose at the Commonwealth and the world, had deliberately
scuttled the peace initiatives by bombing the capitals of three African
Commonwealth Countries early that morning.
., .By afternoon security forces had invaded the campus to baton-charge,
,t,e.':lr:g~s,.. ~d,'~pray.:-9y~. University, s~udents.holding .. a peaceful anti-bombing"
rally on the soccer field. We learned, further, that the Crossroads conflict
reported in morning papers was much more serious than first thought, and
spreading. What I mistook for burning autumn leaves, was the thatch on
thousands of huts being burned to the ground on the Cape Flats!
Befo~e the week ende~ smok~ had blotted out the sun, visibility at nearby
Malan airport was practically nil. The homes of some 35,000 Africans in
Crossroad's squatter communities had been destroyed, 35 to 40 killed, and
thousands wounded. Pretoria called it black-on-black rivalry--older residents
against the radical youth. But according to eyewitnesses and volunteers from
Cape Town's religious, civic, educational, media, and relief organizations who
had moved in at some peril to provide aid to refugees whom the government
refused to assist, it was a well executed military-like operation directed and
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protected by white troops using black "vigilantes."g Sirens punctuated our days
and nights as ambulances and the police traversed the road near my flat en
route to and from the township. .
Within a fortnight there was a second prolonged attack on Crossroads.
The temporary tent housing, relief kitchens, and medical clinics set ~p .earlier
by Cape Town agencies were first ~urned to the ground. ~hen, the VIgilantes,
with protection of armored security pe~sonnel, ~oved ~to the ~eas the
government wished destroyed. The shootmg, burmng, beatmg, slashing went
on for five days and nights. An additional 35,000 to 40,000 people were left
homeless 40 more were killed. Four white journalists were shot, and a fifth
hacked to death as police stood by. The meaning was clear! The Minister of
Law and Order congratulated white troops for their restraint in h~dling the
''black unrest." The white, liberal PFP party10 used the floor of Parliament to
condemn the Afrikaner regime for bragging to the world a month before that
they were ending forced removal and influx control only to dev~lop ~ new
"influx control technique," i.e., burning down Crossroads.... And out In Mitchell
Plains young blacks, in hopeless rage, beat to death yet another fellow black
alleged to have been a police informant.
Before the month was out Botha rei~stated t.he Nati~nal Emergency, t!Us
one more oppressive than anything experienced since the infamous Sharpeville
era of 1960.11 News sources were silenced, ten thousand--many we knew--
were rounded up and detained those first weeks, usually in the middle of the
night. Some 30,000 men, women and children were incarcerated by the end of
the year. 12 Everywhere meetings were forbidden, offices and home~ broken
into and trashed, black townships terrorized. I saw riot police terrorize those
(whites) leaving a rally at City Hall for the p~ oPP?sition party, was vi~eo­
taped as I left a noon meeting on human rights m St. George ~ghc~
Cathedral next door to Parliament, and watched helplessly as University
colleagues were clubbed and whipped for st~d~ng in quiet vi~il ":,hile le~ders
petitioned the state President. I and other parishioners were ~ven o~eminute
to disperse" by riot police in gas masks as we left a memorial service at my
community Congregational Church, while out on the Cape Flats the mosq.ue
of my young Malaysian colleague wa~ being tear gassed and. sprayed With
gunfire; and down-the road the--entIre Col~ured' co~gregatIon"'~200 plus·
people) was detained for having a church serVIc.e hono~mg Soweto s dead.
Lines from a turn of the century South Afncan writer captured my own
incredulity and sorrow immediately following those May days: "I can tell you
the things that happened as I saw them, and what the rest was about only
Africa knows" (Boseman 1947).
NEW QUESTIONS FROM FIELD AND DATA
A common textbook notion of social inquiry is that one forms hypotheses,
then gathers data to confirm or negate them (Bellah 1962). But. in the real
world the challenge is to know when to abandon a hypothesis, refm~ a
concept, pose a new question, and to know that the same data often contains
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multiple studies (Davis 1962). Our project was focused on conflict and change
strategies/goals to end apartheid. As significant and appealing as these issues
were, and are, others began to nag, e.g., Afrikaner staying power, a
quarrelsome resistance movement. What apart from coercion enables this
infamous system to function? What integrative mechanisms hold it together?
And in Joseph Lelyveld's words, 'Why do blacks with all of their numbers
endure what we fmd unendurable" (1986, p. 185)? Distance from the field
has not dimmed the compelling nature of these questions. I fmd myself
wrestling still. And it is these I wish to highlight in this section.
Legitimacy, Ideology, and Illegitimacy
South Africa seems to defy political sociology's most cherished
propositions. We see legitimacy of the system as central to analysis of state
control, thanks to Weber. Further, we know that for the exercise of power
by the few to be legitimate, an effective ideology is required. Marx taught us
that a society's "dominant ideology" is a means to mask elite class interests and
to justify their privilege. The popular "elite manipulation" concept (Marxists
speak of "engineering of consent") assumes a general acceptance by both
rulers and masses that inequities are somehow just, natural, or beneficial (see
Huber and Form 1973).
Afrikaner Nationalism has been the guiding ideology of South Africa's
ruling elite (although there is less certitude among today's adherents). A belief
in self-determination, in the volk, a sense of divine mission, and racial/ethnic
exclusivism are at its core. But it is not a dominant ideology. It has been the
exclusive province of the small Afrikaner populace, used to forge an ethnic
whole in the decades following the Anglo-Boer Wars and to bar, not
incorporate, others--black and white English-speakers alike. 13 The Nationalist
government has n~~~r.~~~J;l.)~giti.p1a~.~q.tw..:!~~....ey~s of its ..:majQ~. constituency;
internal legitimacy has rested solely with the small enfranchised white
population. (External legitimacy is, of course, another matter.)
If a dominant ideology to undergird internal legitimacy is absent, then
what of illegitimacy. which is central to theory on. social revolution? The
prevalent voluntaristic position is that revolution occurs when state agencies
fail to ensure basic loyalty, are deemeduojusr.cor raa.coanter to emergent
class interests (Johnson 1966; Brinton 1938; Gurr 1971). Therefore, serious
observers have been predicting the imminent overthrow of South Africa's
regime for decades. Pierre van den Berghe's observation, made a quarter of
a century ago, is typical: "The likelihood of revolution seems high. Mounting
internal strains and external pressures doom white supremacy within the near
future" (1965, p. 262).
Rejecting voluntaristic views of revolution, Theda Skocpol (1980) suggests
that even without legitimacy a state can remain stable, invulnerable to internal
challenges, "especially if its coercive organizations remain coherent and
effective,"--and there are no major outside threats.14 So one common answer
to questions regarding the ongoing survival of totalitarian regimes such as
South Africa's is that coercion maintains· the necessary functional
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interdependence (Marger 1985, p. 211; van den Berghe 1965; cf. Cell 1982, p.
246).15 Rich resources have certainly enabled Pretoria to develop
extraordinary security might, safe in the hands of those committed to
Afrikanerdom. There is little chance of their disaffection and a great will to
survive. Despite high but tolerable illegitimacy costs, acceptance matters
primarily for cohesion within the Afrikaner community, say many of the
"compliance through coercion" school. Only as it experiences growing
fragmentation will crises arise (cf. Adam and MoodIey 1986, pp. 41-44).
Other scholars argue, however, that coerced compliance isbut one piece
of the puzzle. The use of raw force as the compliance mechanism is not
sufficient over long periods of time (Marger 1981). Societies relying primarily
on force are always precarious, and Pretoria is not yet demonstrably
precarious. It may well be that in this system of rigid. control the limits of
tolerance are constantly being tested and "renegotiated" (Cell 1982; Butler,
Elphick and Welsh 1987).
Fostering Compliance
What seems apparent at this juncture is that Pretoria's survival through
time has been based on the regime's gaining a pragmatic acquiescence--
"compliance without consent" in Heribert Adam's terms (1986)--in part by
means less direct than raw coercion. The so-called "reform" policies of the
Botha government illustrate not only coldly efficient political policing but a
successful manipulative capacity to foster compliance through a variety of
integrative techniques. Questions growing out of the field experience alerted
me to three phenomena that beg further study: contrived legitimacy, resistance
movement destabilization, and dependency and co-optation.
Contrived Legitimacy. States attempt to create legitimacy in a variety of
ways. I found the South African preoccupation with the "rule by law"--seen by
many as synonymous with "rule of law"--to be one of the most intriguing
examples of a kind of artificiallegitimation.16 From its initial rise to power
over forty years ago the Afrikaner regime has--unlike most totalitarian states
that ignore the law--secured statutory authority to enforce apartheid.. The.
conscientious use of law to deny human rights means that they have
, . deliberately deprecated. the humanistic assumptions of justice .attached to the .
Western notion of "rule of law." "Legality becomes a substitute for legitimacy"
and laws "enthrone the system of lawlessness" (see Adam and Moodley 1986;
Westcott 1988; Butler, Elphick and Welsh 1987).
.Many interviewees could not comprehend that "rule of law" isbrought into
disrepute when, divorced from universal values, it is used to deny basic
freedoms. To them "law is law," used to obtain order (cf. Davenport 1987 pp.
576-578). Informants assured me that their current judicial system worked
honorably because judges made sure the laws, whatever their content, were
followed; spokesmen from both the political right and left viewed.our Bill of
Rights with skepticism. For many, the excessive liberty is a threat to
"civilization," to stability, hence--it would seem--the self-policing.
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Resistance Movement Destabilization. I was, of course, familiar with the
history of the country's resistance movement and the historic splits in African
Nationalis!D 17 (see Leat!, Kneife~ and Nurnberger 1986). But I arrived inSou~ AfrI<:'l WIth the WIdelr share~ assumption that common purpose and
growing unity now characte?Zed activist organizations (cf. Martin 1988), and
I w~ unprepare~ for the thinly masked discord, the ideological disputes, and
not infrequent VIolence that punctuated much movement interaction. Thebl~ck-white conflict that erupted in late 1984, while helping to unifymany like-
mmded groups within one coordinating body or another (OOF and NF being
the ~est ~own), se~med, nevert~eless, to resurrect stale debates, spawn new
factionalism, .and heighten rhetoric between and among dozens of competing
camps. In spite of the current push for freedom old cleavages were not in
check.
. The best known,. and onlr viable external nationalist organization today,
Is,.of course, the ~can National Congress. But ANC is still banned and ine~le after nearly thirty years; its Charter provides an important ideological
guide for a great many, but by no means a majority of urban blacks according
to reliable data (Orkin 1986).18 It was founded 77 years ago almost a decadebef~re ~e Chinese Communist Party and three years bef~re the Afrikaner~atio~alist Party now. governing the country. When compared with other
liberation moyements. It has re~d relatively few successes, periodic news
releases ?otwithstanding. The realities are that the ANC "threat" has been,
and con~ues to be, exaggerated by both sides for propaganda purposes.
Further, informants who have met wi~ ANC leaders in exile over the pastt~ree years fm~ them to. be as bewildered as anyone regarding ways tod15~odg~ the Afrikaner regime. Nor 15 there any sign that they have addressed
their failures or seek new strategies (Adam 1988). ANC's problems reflect the
weaknesses of the broaderprotest movement.
Why the seeming failure after so many years? The obvious answer is theGove~.ent's s~c~ess in ~olati~g, intimidating, and destabilizing leaders and
orgamzanon, WIthin the hb~rationmovement thereby sapping energies andresource~. To be s,?"e,. resistance groups are skilled in establishing newl~adersh~p and or/?anIZational structures to replace those banned, but it takes~l1l~e; fatlgue.~~ts lD~~and.fatali1?m.Re.si.&t~c.ebecomes.a way of life,·an end
m Itself as leaders become isolated from the masses.
. Not all movement failure can be laid directly to state tyranny, however.~V1~ence suggest.s.~at ~he opposition has allowed its potential strength to be
d!ssIpated. To CrItiCIZe 15 to give comfort to the enemy and my guilt level is
high, for one soon learns that the spirit of the movement must be maintained
the people encouraged to fight on. Yet there is a desperate need to mov~
fron,t failed ~I~ns to wo~kable solutions. Battles over diverse strategies,
myriad Marxist !nterpretatlons, or "purity" of belief have fragmented, quite
apart. from official atte~pts to do so. Above all, activists have developed a
morbid fear ?f appeanng compromised by apartheid that haunts the
movement. It 15 a .fe~ that has voided most political efforts (see Lelyveld
1986); the vast majonty of leaders have opted for a "politics of abstennon,"
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boycotting co-operative efforts between or amo~g disparate ~ti-aparthe~d
groups, and precluding all interventioni~t tec~9ues. I~tltratIon of. basic
institutions--a common sense, not to mention Leninist, tactic-has be~~V1ew~d
as "selling out." Only the black trade unions have been granted legitimacy m
their use of "the system" (Van Zyl Slabbert 1987; Evans 1987; Adam and
Moodley 1986).19 . . . .
Absence of a unifying ideology, lack of political confrontation or bormg
from within detachment from the masses, erosion of will, unreasonedfear ofco-optation~-all of these seem to ~ec~ and to be aff~ctedby Pretoria's direct
and indirect techniques of destabilization and compliance.. .
Dependency and Co-optation. This is the I~sue that 15, I be.lieve,
potentially the most damaging for the anti-apartheid movement. In spIte. of
rigidmigrationlaws, unwantedgrowth of the country's u~ban blackpopulation
during the past fifteen years and the consequent escal~tIon of.unrest, has.led
Pretoria to look increasingly at dependency as an integrative mechanism
(South African Race Relations Survey 1985,.1986). Marxists ~peak of a "dull
compulsion of circumstances" and the creation of .false consclous~ess amo~g
the masses. But BarringtonMoore (1966) has provided a more te.lhng ~alysls
for South Africa's condition by stressing the importance of daily ~ablt and
conditioning in the acceptance of injustice. The drudgery of the datl~.rou~ds
and struggles for survival elicit acquiescence independent of any legitimating
ideology (Cell 1982, p. 246; Adam and Moodley 1986).
President Botha's so-called reform policies have used black dependency
to foster compliance through the use of patronag~, access to state-controlled
services and media orchestrationto create a desire for consumer goods and
life in the "Western· mode.20 An insidious outgrowth of this ~epen~e~cy
syndrome is the potential for co-optation, an ever-pre~ent dan~er,m socI~tIes
with great inequities. The gradual growth of the Afrikaner e~te s perceived
need for black confederates is an intriguing phenomenon; smce the early
1980's the state has excellerated attempts to provide stability via the
recruitment of collaborators.
The earliest black collaborators of consequence were, of course, the
cadres Pretoria placed in control of the rural bantustans starting in~ 19?1.
Given "self-governing" status in 1961, these bUFeaucr~ts ~e authoritarian
patron-clients par excellence. But apart from police informants, th~
governmentapparentlysaw little need for wooing an urban.blackstratum ~ntil
the end of the 1970's when local pundits began talking of an Af~lcan
bourgeoisie ripe for incorporation. Aside from an in~ipient black .busmess
sector, the black middle class consists largelyof professional an~ white collar
workerswho are, more often than not, in the forefrontof the ~eslstance. Th~y
are not co-optible and have rejected suggestions of preferential. treatment m
returnfor their political neutrality. By the early 1980's reports circulated that
Pretoria was really interested in an elite working class who could.become
urbanblack "insiders" (a few million, at most) willing to keep competmg rural
Africans out of the townships. But Pretoria's intent to. target a la~or
aristocracy--skilled, industrial workers with the most secure Job and housing
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rights--also seemed do~m~d. Th~y were u~ .against a burgeoning union
~ovementwho~e organizational skills and political awareness have increased
Immeasurably m recent years. (see The Christian Science Monitor 1988.
W~sh~ngton Post National Weekly 1987) Data suggest that by late 1985 trad~
unionists were among the strongest opponents of the white regime (Orkin
1986, pp. 14-17.)
Further, the state's simultaneous attempts at co-opting Asians and
Coloureds was but marginally more successful. In late 1984 over four-fifths
of t?~m Ie~ by middle cla;;s protesters, re~cted with violence, refusing to
partIcl~ate m the new ~lections or to recogmze. those who did. Only a small
gro~p ~ each commumty elected to take part in the Tricameral Parliament
as "~~nIor partners," Pr~toria's deracialization pretence. With the intense
hostility and fragmentation their involvement engendered, they too have
be~ome "collaborators"--unrepresentative, isolated from and threatened by,
their own people.
Pretoria's real success in enlisting a black urban faction finally came in
1986 .and ~Crossroad~ Burning" provided a bird's-eye view of this official
techmque m the making. To quell unrest, to be rid of unwanted blacks to
sup~ress community spiri~ ~d mobilization, to exploit community divisio;, to
pumsh protesters, and to institute or restore the township council authority as
called f?~ under Botha's new constitution, the government turned to the so-
called VIgII~te ~oups (usually with Council ties) that had emerged across the
land sometime m 1985. The protracted use of surrogate forces came to be
called ~e "Crossroads Option" since it was there that use was formalized on
a massive scale, and I watched the birth of what I perceive to be the most
dama~~ of collaborationist efforts for the future of South Africa.
WIthm th~ multiform town~hips th~ dependency levels of many residents
make. th~m r!pe for patron-client alliances, and the nucleus of vigilante
orgamzations m Crossroads and elsewhere consisted of a desultory group. At
first t~ey were e~a-Iegal, then administrative authorities gradually began toexplO1~ the tensI.ons as township factions attacked one another. Vigilantes
brutal.1Zedan? killed; they were brutalized. and killed in return (see endnote
9). Wlt~ ~he Infamous Crossroads incident the informal and non-legal statuso~ the.VIgtlante~..changed. They became part of. carefully' planned operations
directed by police and defense forces, as my interviewees confirmed,
.Th~ s1.!cces~ in. the Cap~ Town area and elsewhere led to the next step,
the mstItutIonalIZatIon of vigilantes. Advertising for "black community guards"
was followed by government announcement in September 1986 that
"municipal constables" were being recruited throughout the u;ban c~nters
These untrained "forces," between 10,000 and 20,000 by the end of 1987, wer~
not under the police, but rather, under the new local black Council members
and ultimately Pretoria's Department of Constitutional Development (SASH
1987, p. 5-9).
Some m~ybe tempted to label the vigilantes and their "uniformed cousins"
a .nasce~t middle ~lass phenomenon, but this is, I believe, inaccurate and
misleading. Class IS, of course, difficult to isolate given the great diversity
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within township labor pools and "legal" residence groupings. But with notable
exceptions those recently co-opted appear to be (like those now serving on the
township councils) an amalgam of the older, more traditional, less educated
and their unemployed adult childrea, low status .State service workers, non-
union laborers, some "hole-in-the-wall" shop-keepers; and members of the
lumpenproletariat including hooligans, thugs, and illegal hangers-on--all groups
for whom economic stability is uncertain, life marginal (Haysom 1986).
During the past two years this black "constabulary," along with the growing
township administrative bureaucracies, has forced an uneasy and brutal truce
upon the urban centers in return for jobs, perks, and power over their fellow
townsmen.21 While the dialectics of co-optation discredit the co-opted once
patronage is accepted, such enlistment has served to strengthen Pretoria's
hegemony (see Adam 1988). Further solidification of these collaborationist
efforts was revealed in a brief government announcement as reported in the
U.S. by National Public Radio's "Morning Edition" on May 16, 1989. A
national organization of township councillors was being formed to work with
white administrative officials in establishing black participation in a "State
President's Council,"22 something liberation activists have adamantly refused
to do.
Thus the Afrikaner elite has, at least for now, succeeded in suppressing
community grassroots mobilization by pitting black against black (SASH
1987b). But urban residents are a different breed than are the "governed" in
the homelands. In addition to learning just how the new sector of co-opted
urban blacks differs from their fellow townsmen, it is, therefore, crucial to
learn whether or not they are actually becoming a more dangerous urban
version of the hated, all powerful bantustan administrative satraps. These
questions are central to the future of anti-apartheid resistance.
CONCLUSION
I am sensitized to the hazards of prophecy where South Africa's future
is concerned (Burgess 1983). Not a single activist leader I.spoke with after
mid-1986 felt that there would be an end to apartheid in the forseeable future.
.' .They .spoke of long, dark days and protracted struggles, of life on ..Pretoria's
terms. Few offered new thoughts on tactics or goals, although the movement
spirit burned on. And yet, there are always signs of hope--the burgeoning and
vital black labor movement that inevitably increases the number of informed
politicized blacks; tentative moves toward ending movement dissonance as a
variety of activist organizations have sought co-operative efforts within the past
18 months; ever-widening cracks in the once monolithic Afrikaner community
that makes white rule increasingly vulnerable.
But hope for an "early" solution must be tempered by reality. The
resilience of Pretoria and its sophistication in manipulatin~ compliance via
indirect mechanisms, as well as by coercion, is impressive. Success in use
of such techniques may well mean that the government can pre-empt the need
to negotiate with authentic black liberation groups via its incorporation of
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competing black factions into its system. White manipulation of an acquiescing
black strata outside the resistance movement allows Pretoria to control the
direction and speed of change. This appears to be the Nationalist Party's
interim--if not long term--"solution" as the State moves from an ethnic
oligarchy to an emergent "multi-racial autocracy" (cf. Van ZyI Slabbert 1988).
Change for the forseeable future would seem to come "not with a bang, but
a whimper."
In his 1988 Presidential address to the American Sociological Association,
Herbert Gans pointed to a growing number of problems facing our discipline
(1989). One observation seemed especially salient; with our increasing reliance
on easily quantifiable secondary data, too many of us "learn about society"
without ever leaving our offices. And we rationalize this by suggesting that this
is somehow .more scientific and meaningful than is intensive, on site
investigation (Gans 1989, p.ll).24 I am convinced, however, that "being there"
is one way we sociologists--and our work--can be taken more seriously by the
growing numbers who question our purpose.
That my most recent time in South Africa became an affair both of the
heart and the head, was, I now feel, an unanticipated bonus. It is "an affair"
I am ready to rekindle; there is much for this sociologist to learn. Nkosi
Sikelel' i Afrika!
ENDNOTES
1. The essays in Sociologists at Work (Hammond 1962) include some fine
analyses of methodological and conceptual decision-making but they are,
with one or two exceptions, fairly "no-nonsense" impersonal accounts.
2. An expansion of this theme will appear in a future edition of Sociological
Spectrum.
3. The Centre Director, a fellow sociologist whom I had met at various
professional conferences in Africa and the United States, became a valued
. colleague and .myfavorite oxymoron--an Afrikaner Quaker, imbued with
allof ,~~ complexities and contradictions whichthat strangecombination
conjures up.
4. I have come to empathize with South African Journalist (Newsweek) Peter
Younghusband who contends that he has yet to read a work on African
politics that isn't out of date by the time it is published (1986).
5. In addition, our country's extreme rightists have enjoyed touring South
Africa to see "how it is done" and they give new meaning to the "ugly
American" syndrome.
6. For example, a reporter from one of the major newspapers told me over
lunch one day that the U. S. "Senate is the most undemocratic body in the
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world;" A law professor informed a group I was in that. ~e American Bill
of Rights mainly protects private property; and an activist leader 9uoted
in a Sunday paper informed his readers that "The CIA was responsible for
Nelson Mandela's capture and imprisonment in 1961" (Sunday Star 1986).
7. For background purposes I had ~een attending .as many rallies, lectures,
governance sessions, demonstrations, ~d ~eetIngs as I .could ~anage-­
something I had found extremely useful In Zimbabwe durmg thea war for
liberation.
8. One can hope that some of the American social scientists doing research
in China during the pro-democracy protests and subsequent crack-down
will address aspects of this issue.
9. Township governance structures were in disarray throughout much of the
country by early 1985 as grass-roots resistance groups challenged the
newly constituted township councils, held rent boycotts, e:tc. At the s~e
time conservative anti-activist elements also arose to Vie for township
control and soon came to be known as "vigilantes," (along with a variety
of other nicknames--"Whitedoekes" in Crossroads, for the white headbands
they wore when on the rampage).
10. The PFP joined with two small splinter groups on February 11, 1989, to
form a new "multi-racial" Democratic Party.
11. It is also by far the longest "Emergency." Put into effect on June 12, 1986,
it was renewed for the fourth time on June 10, 1989.
12. One should keep in mind that this is a country of only 32 million people
(compared to China's one billion plus, for example).
13. Given forty years ofAfrikaner educational and ~ed~a control, lllany. of
the values and myths have filtered into t~e thinkin~.of th~ ~n.gbsh
community,although the 18th/19th .century ~beral tradl~ien. ofmdl~dua1
freedoms "free enterprise," and human nghts remams a consistent
competit~rwithin the educated elite. But, with some exceptions, it has n?t
influenced blacks. Exceptions do exist: As recently as late 1985 Orkm
found that 8% of the black urban populace still "preferred" white rule
(1986). (Data on rural black~ is lacking.) In addit~on, there is a co~mon
belief among blacks that Afrikaners, but not English-speakers, havm? ~o
place else to go, do belong in Africa. This is an impo.rtant.p}ank Within
Afrikaner ideology. And there are some black apostobc religious groups
who seem to accept white rule "as ordained."
14. An over-extension of military activity in Angola, Namibia and
hMozambique may have begun to pose such an "outside threat." Sout
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Africa's willingness--at long last--to reach a settlement re Namibia's
independence may signal an awareness of potential danger.
15. One debate now raging among activists and intellectuals concerns
capitalism's role in racial coercion. Is apartheid extrinsic or intrinsic to
capitalism, an impediment or a servant of South African business?
Contrary to posturing on both sides, there is not yet a defmitive answer;
it remains a key issue for probing re conflict and change.
16. This technique has had success both within and without the country's
borders. Apologists often cite South African "rule of law" to distinguish
it from other authoritarian systems (e.g., DuBuisson 1989).
17. During the 1950's the Pan-Africanist Congress (PAC) broke from the
African National Congress (ANC) over the ANC Charter position of land
ownership by all as opposed to PAC's "African only" stance. There was
also the popular Black Consciousness Movement of 1967-77 that broke
with and eclipsed, ANC, as did Chief Buthulezi and Inkatha in the 1970's.
There were, in addition, numerous lesser divisions.
18. In late 1985 Mark Orkin found that Nelson Mandela or ANC were
preferred by just under one-third of the nation's urban blacks. When
ANC surrogate--the UDF--was included, nearly two-fifths preferred the
ANC political thrust (1986, pp. 35-40). In addition to such firm support
there is evidence of additional "soft support." For example in Chief
Buthulezi's Durban stronghold nearly 56% said blacks would try to help
ANC if asked by them to do so (Indicator South Africa 1984, p. 6). We
have little or no data on the preferences of roughly half of the African
population who reside in the rural hinterland, however.
19. The black labor movement may come to hold the key to liberation
strategies of the future, thereby providing the needed breakthrough for
ending apartheid.
20. The message is relentless: Happy blacks own TV's, get bargains at "OK
Bazaars," avoid political troublemakers, enjoy a harmonious "Morning In
South Africa" life. The message is proclaimed each day over black radio
and TV in Twsana, Zulu, Sotho, or Xhosa.
21. Numerous murders at the hands of these large, undisciplined cadres have
been reported during the past two years (SASH 1987b).
22. The report said the new organization was to be called the "National
Forum," a name stolen directly from one of the current legitimate
liberation (pro-PAC) coordinating bodies.
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23. Its continued ability to manipulate the Western Powers is also impressive.
President Bush's invitation to Mr. de Klerk (the new head of the
Afrikaner Nationalist Party) to meet with him in Washington is the most
recent case in point. The invitation breaks a long standing tradition of
denying this form of official recognition.
24. Perhaps this is why Gans and incoming (1989) ASA President, Joan
Huber, are concerned about the amount of "trivia"being churned out by
today's sociologists. Huber's address before the Southern Sociological
Society's annual meeting, April 1989, underscored the Irrelevance issue."
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